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DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY 

EVALUATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

By A. J. de ZEEUW and F, van der PLOEG* 
1.  Introduction 
THIS  paper  gives  an overview  of  the  various  equilibrium concepts  used  in 
non-cooperative difference games and their economic interpretation. Difference 
games are dynamic games in discrete time. The state of  the economy at time 
t,  say yt depends on the state of  the economy at time t - 1, y,- ,,  and on the 
actions of the various players undertaken during this period. (Differential games 
are dynamic games in continuous time.) Difference games are unlike repeated 
games (supergames), because the latter refer to the repetition of  a static game 
where the state of the economy in each game is independent of  the state of the 
economy in previous games. History in repeated games matters only because 
players might condition their strategies on the history of  play, but history in 
difference games matters  also due to the dynamics of  capital accumulation, 
wages, prices, etc. 
To illustrate the various concepts employed in difference  games, it is useful 
to discuss a classic example where actions can take on only one of  two values. 
Figure 1 gives a simple example of  such a dynamic game (due to Simaan and 
Cruz (1973)). The economy starts off  in  the state yo = 0. Subsequently each 
player can either take the action L or H. Each player minimizes a welfare loss 
function,  which  is  time  separable. The  welfare  losses  incurred  during  the 
transition from the state at time 0 to the state at time  1 are given  above the 
actions. From each state at time  1, each player can again take the actions L 
or H and at time 2 arrive at four possible  states. The Nash solution concept 
represents the standard approach to non-cooperative games and is applicable 
when both players have equal strength. The actions in a Nash equilibrium must 
be the best response of player 1 to the action of player 2 and the best response 
of  player  2  to the  action  of  player  1. In  dynamic  games one distinguishes 
between the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash or subgame- 
perfect  equilibrium. Two assumptions distinguish  the feedback  concept from 
the open-loop concept, namely information structure (Ba~ar  and Olsder (1982)) 
and period  of  commitment  (Reinganum and Stokey (1985)). The open-loop 
Nash equilibrium presumes that the players at time 1 and 2 can only observe 
the initial state of  the economy, yo, i.e. have open-loop information patterns. 
The open-loop Nash equilibrium also presumes that at time 0 each player can 
make binding commitments about the actions he or she announces to undertake 
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FIG.I. Feedback equilibria in  a dynamic game (extensive form) 
in period 1 and 2, i.e. the period of commitment is equal to the entire planning 
period. 
The normal form of the open-loop game associated with Figure 1 is presented 
in Table 1. The open-loop Nash equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of 
the reaction curve of  player 1 (indicated by ") and the reaction curve of player 
2 (indicated by  b). The open-loop Nash equilibrium means that player 1 plays 
H in the first period and L in the second period, that player 2 plays H in both 
periods, and that the welfare  losses  are 8 to player  1 and 9 to player  2. The 
feedback Nash equilibrium presupposes that each player can observe the state 
of the economy at the beginning of the current period and therefore corresponds 
to a dynamic information structure and a period of  commitment of  one. It is 
constructed by imposing subgame perfectness, that is the Nash equilibrium for 
the whole game must remain a Nash equilibrium for every  subgame starting DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
TABLE 1 
Open-loop equilibria in a dytlanlic game (nornlal fortn) 
Player 2 
Player I  LL  LH  HL  HH 
Vest response of player  I  to player 2 (player 1's reaction curve) 

"est  response of  player 2 to player  I  (player 2's  reaction curve) 

'Open-loop Nash equilibrium 

"pen-loop  Stackelberg equilibrium (with 2 as leader) 

from an abritrary state at some point in time after the beginning of the whole 
game. One constructs the feedback  Nash  or subgame-perfect equilibrium by 
dynamic programming. This can be done with the aid of the extensive form of 
the game presented in Figure 1. First, one calculates the Nash equilibrium for 
each of the three subgames in the second period. One then adds on the resulting 
welfare losses to the welfare losses in the subgame of  period 1, which results in 
7,2  for L, H, ll,6  for L, L, 8,9  for H, H and 5, 12 for H, L, and finally calculates 
the Nash equilibrium for the game starting from yo = 0 i.e. 7, 2 for L, H. In the 
resulting feedback Nash equilibrium player 1 's actions are L and H whilst player 
2's  actions are H and L and both players are better off  than in the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium (see Table 2). It is also possible to construct examples where 
the players are better off in the open-loop Nash equilibrium (see section 2.2). 
Hence, making use of  information as it becomes  available, can make players 
worse off in the context of a dynamic game, even though it always is profitable 
in a one-player context. There are many applications of open-loop and feedback 
Nash equilibria in dynamic games, e.g. conflict over the distribution of income 
in capitalist  economies (Lancaster (1973)), conflict  over  the  harvesting  of  a 
TABLE 2 
Weyare losses under the various outcomes 
Actiotls of  Actions of  Webre 
Solution co~lcept  player  I  player  2  losses 
Feedback Nash (subgame-perfect)  LH  HL  7, 2 
equilibrium 
Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium  LH  LL  64 
(and reneging outcome) 
Open-loop Nash equilibrium  H L  HH  8,9 
Open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium  LL  LH  11, 6 615  A. J. DE ZEEUW AND F. VAN DER PLOEG 
common  renewable  resource  (Reinganum and Stokey (1985); van  der Ploeg 
(1986)),  price sluggishness in duopolistic competition (Fershtman and Kamien 
(1987)), capacity  investment  in  industrial  organization  (Reynolds (1987)), 
conflict  over  arms accumulation  (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1990)), and 
international pollution control (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1991)). 
The Lucas (1976)  critique of econometric policy evaluation has increased the 
interest in applications of rational expectations and non-cooperative difference 
(or differential) game  theory  to  dynamic  economic or econometric models, 
because these  techniques  take explicit  account  of  the  reaction of  the  private 
sector  (such as  households  and firms) to  expected  changes  in  government 
economic  policy.  Non-cooperative  difference  (or differential)  games  of  the 
Stackelberg variety, with  the government as leader  and the private sector  as 
follower, can provide a behavioural foundation of macroeconomic models with 
expectations of  future government economic policy  affecting the current state 
of the economy. Obviously, the advantage of  difference (or differential) games 
of the Stackelberg variety over ad hoc rational expectations models is that they 
are immune to the Lucas (1976) critique policy evaluation as the behaviour of 
the  private  sector  is  no longer  invariant  to  the  policy  rule  adopted  by  the 
government. 
To illustrate some counter-intuitive results and other problems found with 
Stackelberg  equilibria,  it  is  best  to  return  to  the  example  presented  in 
Figure  1. The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium with player 2 as leader and 
player  1 as follower  assumes  that both  players  have  open-loop information 
structures  (i.e. can  only  observe  yo) and  that  player  2  can  make  binding 
commitments about his or her future policy actions. Player 2 chooses the best 
action taking account of player 1's reaction curve (denoted by " in Table I), so 
that he or she chooses to play L followed by H and obtains a welfare loss of 
6. The follower plays L in both periods and gets a welfare loss of  11. Note that 
the leader is better off  (which is always the case) whilst  the follower  is worse 
off (which is not always the case) than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium (see 
Table 2). It  is  well  known  that  open-loop Stackelberg dynamic  games  (or 
economies  with  rational expectations) are characterized by  forward-looking 
(as well  as  backward-looking) behaviour  due to  the  anticipation of  future 
actions of  dominant players (such as the Treasury  or the  Central Bank). In 
such models the problem of  time inconsistency arises, that is dominant players 
have an incentive to alter previous plans when they are called upon to execute 
those plans (Kydland and Prescott (1977)).  For example, in the beginning of the 
planning period the leader finds it optimal to play L followed by H. However, 
once the first period has elapsed, the leader finds it optimal to renege and play 
L, inducing the follower to play H, as this reduces his or her welfare loss from 
6 to 4. If  there are no binding commitments, it is quite clear that such models 
are vulnerable  to  cheating  from  the  side  of  the  dominant  player  (e.g.  the 
government) and, therefore, the initial plan of the dominant player will generally 
not be believed. It is  important  to note that cheating is only to be expected 
when the short-term gains of cheating outweigh the long-term losses of cheating, 616  DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
which is more likely to happen when the rate of time preference used to discount 
punishments from cheating is large (Barro and Gordon (1983); Meijdam and 
de Zeeuw (1986)).  In the case of  incomplete information about preferences it 
is possible that the dominant player builds a reputation by being tough in the 
early stage of the games and blows its reputation in the final stages of the game 
(Kreps and Wilson, (1982); Backus and Driffill(1985)). 
If  the government cannot commit itself or does not have a strong reputation, 
the private sector cannot be  expected  to believe time-inconsistent  announce- 
ments and therefore such policies are not credible. The feedback  Stackelberg 
solution concept (Simaan and Cruz (1973))  assumes that the players can change 
their strategies at all points in time on the basis of observations on the evolution 
of  the  state  of  the  economic  system  and is  therefore  by  construction  time- 
consistent. This solution concept can be seen as an extension of  the principle 
of  optimality  (Bellman (1957)) to games. In terms  of  the example, one first 
calculates the  Stackelberg equilibrium  associated with  every  subgame in the 
second period, then adds on the resulting welfare losses to the welfare losses of 
the game starting with p,  = 0, and finally calculates the Stackelberg equilbrium 
for this game. In the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium the follower plays L and 
H whilst the leader plays L and L. The associated welfare losses are 6 and 4, 
respectively. This provides  a counter-example to the  view  that  the  leader is 
always better  off  in a Stackelberg than in a Nash game. In fact, the leader's 
welfare  loss  increases from  2  in  the  feedback  Nash  equilibrium  to  4  in  the 
feedback  Stackelberg equilibrium  whilst  the follower's  welfare loss improves 
from  7  to  6.  It  also  provides  a  counter-example  to  the  view  that  in  the 
(time-consistent) feedback  Stackelberg equilibrium  the  players  are worse  off 
than in the (time-inconsistent) open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, because the 
leader reduces his or her welfare loss from 6 to 4 and the follower reduces his 
or her welfare loss from  11 to 6. 
When the idea of  a subgame is restricted to a game starting at some point 
of  time  from  every  possible  state  of  the  economy  at  that  point  of  time, 
the  feedback  Stackelberg  equilibrium  may  be  called  the  subgame-perfect 
Stackelberg equilibrium, although Selten's (1975) original concept of  subgame 
perfectness  is only  relevant  for  the  Nash  equilibrium  concept. Because  it  is 
assumed that the players are ex  ante given the opportunity to renege at each 
stage  of  the  game, ex  post  they  will  not  renege  and  therefore  the feedback 
Stackelberg  equilibrium  leads  to  time-consistent  policies  by  construction. 
However, subgame perfectness is  stronger than time consistency, so that it is 
possible to formulate a time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg solution which 
is not subgame perfect (Meijdam and de Zeeuw (1986)).  The point is that time 
consistency  implies that there is no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium 
path and that subgame perfectness implies that there is no incentive to deviate 
from  points  that  are  off  the  equilibrium  path  either.  The  open-loop  Nash 
equilibrium  is  another  example  of  a  time-consistent  solution  which  is  not 
subgame perfect, because  the fact  that  there is  no dominant player  that can 
manipulate the current actions of  the other players by making announcements 617  A. J. DE ZEEUW AND F. VAN DER PLOEG 
about its own future actions implies  that as long as there are no unexpected 
deviations from the equilibrum path none of  the players  has an incentive to 
renege. When the information structure is such that players have information 
on all past states of the economy and the period of commitment is the planning 
period, it is common to refer to a closed-loop (with memory) dynamic game. 
An  alternative solution concept for non-cooperative games to the Nash or 
Stackelberg  equilibrium  is  the  consistent  conjectural  variations  equilibrium, 
which was introduced in oligopoly theory by Bresnahan (1981)  and was recently 
applied  to an open-loop difference game (Hughes Hallett (1984); Brandsma 
and Hughes Hallett (1984))  and a feedback difference game (Bavar, Turnovsky 
and d'Orey (1986)). Although it has been argued that the concept is logically 
inconsistent (Daughety (1985));  de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1987)),  the main 
importance for the discussion  in  this  paper  is  that  the  open-loop consistent 
conjectural variations equilibrium is time-inconsistent. 
The conventional 'stacking' procedure is often applied to an economic system 
of  difference games to obtain a final-form model (Theil (1964)), which is then 
used for policy  evaluation purposes (e.g. Hughes Hallett, (1984)). A problem 
with  this final-form approach is  that in  fact  the  open-loop model results, so 
that it  is  more difficult  and cumbersome to discuss dynamic issues  such  as 
subgame  perfectness  and  time  inconsistency  (even  though  it  is  possible  to 
discuss with  some difficulty the principle of  multiperiod certainty equivalence 
in a one-player world). 
This  paper  gives  an  overview  of  different  solution  concepts  with  their 
properties and derives the results for a standard class of linear-quadratic policy 
evaluation  problems. The  main  difference  between  this  framework  and the 
example of Figure 1 is that the strategy space is continuous rather than discrete, 
which makes it much more appropriate for economic applications. A comparable 
survey can be found in Bagar (1986), but this paper focusses on different issues 
and attempts to give more verbal explanation of the various solution concepts 
and associated issues of  time consistency, subgame perfectness and credibility. 
Special attention is also given to the consistent conjectural variations approach, 
because it is felt that there are some problems with this approach. In section 
2 a linear-quadratic class of difference games is formulated and different decision 
models or game-theoretic solution concepts are discussed. In section 3 properties 
such as time consistency, subgam~  perfectness  and credibility are defined  and 
evaluated. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  Linear-quadratic difference games: An  evaluation 
2.1. Model and solution concepts 
In this  section  some essential concepts for dynamic policy  evaluation  are 
discussed and a standard class of linear-quadratic difference games is formulated 
in order to elucidate the conceptual discussion. 618  DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
The starting point is a linear dynamic economic model in state-space form: 
The transition  of  the state y  of  the economy from period  t - 1 to period  t is 
influenced by two players (such as the government and the private sector) who 
independently control the exogeneous  variables  x1  and x2,respectively.  The 
non-controllable exogeneous variables are denoted by s. The objective of player 
i, i = 1, 2, is to minimise a quadratic welfare loss function over a finite horizon:  l 
where Qf  and Rf  are symmetric and Qf 2 0 and Rf > 0. An extension with linear 
terms  in  the  welfare  loss  function is  straightforward  by  redefining  the  state 
vector, y,, and s, in an appropriate way. The convex linear-quadratic structure 
is  not essential  for  the  discussion  but  facilitates analytical solutions. It  can 
always be  considered  as an approximation to the  real  structure of  a specific 
model. The problem is  called  an optimal control problem  with  two decision 
makers or a difference game. 
The  traditional approach  (Theil (1964)) to an economic optimal  control 
problem is to cast the economic model (1)  into a final-form model: 
where y, x1and x2stack the state variables y, and the policy  instruments x: 
and x:  for all periods of  the finite planning horizon. Consequently, B1and B2 
are block-triangular matrices composed of  A,, B:  and BZ,and s contains the 
non-controllable exogeneous variables s, as well as the influence of  the initial 
state vector  The corresponding objective functionals become 
where the matrices Qi and Ri  are block-diagonal as the welfare loss functions 
(2) were  assumed  to be time  separable. In this form the problem  cannot be 
distinguished from a static problem, so that it corresponds to the normal form 
of the open-loop difference game. It explains why after this transformation into 
final form it is very difficult to discuss some dynamic issues such as the impact 
of new information or the absence of commitments to future actions. This will 
become clear in the sequel. 
The  by  now  standard  approach  to  a  difference  game  is  to  distinguish 
information  patterns  and  periods  of  commitment.  The  decision  makers  or 
players  announce  strategies  for  the  whole  planning  period  but  may  or 
' Attention is restricted to finite-horizon games, because this is analytically much more tractable. 
The infinite-horizon game can be viewed  as the asymptotic case of  the finite-horizon  game as T 
tends to infinity. 
To be precise, B' = (Bi,)  where Bi, = 0,j  < k,  Bjj = B:, Bi, = n;::  (A,)@, j  > k,  for j  = 1,...7; 
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may  not be  committed  to stick  to these  strategies.  A  strategy is  a mapping 
from the information set and time to the set of  available actions. Considering 
the state of  the economic system, this information set can in principle contain 
only  the  initial  state  (open-loop  information),  only  the  current  state 
(closed-loop, no memory information) or all the states up to the current state 
(closed-loop, memory information). Memory information complicates matters 
considerably and is sometimes excluded on the grounds of  bounded rationality 
(e.g. Rubinstein  (1987)).The model with  an open-loop information structure 
and  a  period  of  commitment  equal  to  the  planning  horizon  is  called  the 
open-loop model. The  model  with  a  closed-loop,  (no) memory  information 
structure and a period  of commitment equal to the planning horizon is called 
the closed-loop model. The model with a closed-loop, no memory information 
structure and a period  of  commitment  of  one period  is  called  the feedback 
model. In the feedback model the players have access to the current state of 
the economy and are ex-ante given the opportunity to renege  on announced 
strategies at each stage of the game, so that in equilibrium they have no incentive 
to renege. The open-loop model is  equivalent to the  optimal control model 
based on a final-form economic model, which was described earlier in (3)  and 
(4). It is  also possible to have asymmetries  between the two players such as 
different roles in the game (i.e. leader/follower), different information patterns 
and different periods of  commitment (see also section 3 and Cohen and Michel 
(1988)). 
The standard techniques  to solve  optimal control problems are Bellman's 
dynamic  programming  and  Pontryagin's  minimum  principle.  For an  optimal 
deterministic control problem with one decision maker the two techniques yield 
the same optimal actions and pe~formance.~  For an optimal control problem 
with two or more decision makers these techniques lead in general to different 
solutions.  The  reason  is  that  dynamic  programming  solves  the  feedback 
model  and  the  minimum  principle  solves  the  open-loop model.  To put  it 
differently, dynamic programming presupposes information on the current state 
of the economic system and no commitments, whereas the minimum principle 
presupposes information on the initial state of the economic system and binding 
commitments. In the context of  a game these assumptions have their influence, 
even when  the world  is  deterministic. In the feedback model  the players can 
observe  the  effects  of  the  actions  of  their  opponent  and  they  can  react 
to these observations, whereas in the open-loop model they cannot. Dynamic 
programming as a solution technique to a one-player optimal control problem 
is  based  on  Bellman's  principle  of  optimality. Dynamic programming as  a 
solution framework for a difference game presupposes a generalization of  the 
principle  of  optimality  to  dynamic  games,  which  is  also  called  subgame 
perfectness and which is treated in more detail in the next section. 
In a stochastic world, dynamic programming leads to policy  feedback rules that take account 
of stochastic shocks and therefore leads to a lower expected welfare loss. 620  DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
The  two  solution  techniques  have  in  common  that  they  transform  the 
dynamic optimization problem into a series of  static optimization problems in 
a dynamic setting. When the minimum principle is  applied, the optimization 
part of the solution is the static optimization of the Hamiltonian. When dynamic 
programming  is  applied  the  optimization  part  of  the  solution  is  the  static 
optimization of  the right-hand side of  the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. 
As a consequence the game theory involved can be reduced to static equilibrium 
concepts. 
2.2.  Open-loop and  feedback  Nash equilibrium 
The standard non-cooperative equilibrium concept is the Nash concept which 
is  based  upon  the idea that there should be  no individual incentive for any 
player  to deviate from  the  equilibrium. The Nash  equilibrium assumes  that 
strategy  choice  is  simultaneous.  Hence,  the  players  choose  their  actions 
simultaneously  and form  expectations about each  other's  actions, which  in 
equilibrium are fulfilled. This implies that the Nash equilibrium is the intersection 
of the hypothetical reaction curves which express the optimal decisions of each 
player conditional on the actions of the rival. For the prototype model (I),  (2) 
the first-order conditions of  the optimization problem, 
where y, is given by (I), lead to the hypothetical reaction functions 
~f  = -(R; + B~'K~B~)-~B~'{K~(A,~,-, + s,) + gf), + ~jxj 
j#i,  i=l,2.  (5') 
For the  open-loop  decision  model  the  terms  {Kfy,+ gf) are the  so-called 
co-states  (also  called  shadow  prices  or  adjoint  variables)  of  Pontryagin's 
minimum principle. They show by how much the welfare loss is increased when 
there is a marginal increase in the state of  the economy, y,. The parameters Kf 
and gf can be determined from the backward recursive  equation^:^ 
where 
An outline of the proofs of these and later results in this section can be found in the appendix A. J. DE ZEEUW AND F. VAN DER PLOEG  621 
For the feedbnck  decision model  the terms Kf  and gf  are the parameters of 
the quadratic so-called value functions of  dynamic programming: 
= min {fy;-lQf-lyt-l+ fxf'Rfxf+ iy;~fyi + g;'y,+ cf). 
xi 
They follow from the backward recursive equations: 
The Nash equilibrium for both decision models is given by the intersection 
of  the two hypothetical reaction functions, (5'): 
XI = Giy,-l + hf,  i = I, 2,  (10) 
where 
Gf = - [ ~ i ] -lBi'Ki[~ ]-
t  t  t  'A, 
and 
It is essential to note that the relationship between xf  and yi-, in (10) is only 
a real functional relationship between actions and state of  the economy in the 
feedback model; it does not represent the policy rule of player i in the open-loop 
model.  Furthermore,  the  feedback  equilibrium  strategies  {Gf,  hf)  are  not 
binding; in the feedback model the strategies can be changed whenever  one of 
the players wants to do so. However, because they form a feedback equilibrium, 
there  will  be  no incentives to change the  policy  rule,  even  after  unexpected 
events. The open-loop equilibrium consists of binding sequences of actions {xf ) 
which result from (10) and (1)  together with (6)  and (7)  and which only depend 
upon the initial state j,,  so that unexpected state trajectories cannot have their 
influence. This open-loop outcome coincides with the Nash equilibrium of  the 
static problem (3), (4). The transformation  of  the economic model into final 
form implies  that the  open-loop model  with  static information  patterns and 
periods of commitment equal to the planning horizon is implicitly assumed. It 
is worth mentioning here that both  open-loop and feedback policy  rules can 622  DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
be inferior to closed-loop memory policy rules where the players condition their 
strategies on information on current and past states of  the economy (Ba~ar  and 
Olsder (1982), Section 6.3; de Zeeuw (1984), Section 4.3). 
The open-loop and feedback Nash decision models can imply very different 
economic results. Consider as an example the problem of  an oligopoly with 
restricted entry and exit harvesting a renewable  resource with zero extraction 
costs,  iso-elastic  demand  and  serially  uncorrelated  shocks  to  the  natural 
replenishment rate. It can then be  shown that the open-loop extraction rates 
obey  Hotelling-type  arbitrage  rules  and  are  therefore  efficient  whilst  the 
feedback Nash equilibrium leads to excessive extraction rates or even extinction 
of  the resource (van der Ploeg (1986)).  The reason is that when an individual 
firm  decides  to harvest  an additional  unit,  it  realizes  that  the  lower  stock 
increases harvesting costs to the other firms and therefore the other firms will 
in the feedback model react by harvesting less. This means that the marginal 
cost  of  harvesting  an additional  unit  is  less  than  in  the  absence  of  such  a 
response from its rivals, hence the feedback model leads to excessive harvesting. 
(With  free  entry  and  exit,  the  harvesting  rates  in  the  feedback  model 
become efficient.) To take another example,  in a model of  competitive arms 
accumulation between  two countries, where each country has a 'guns versus 
butter' dilemma, the feedback Nash equilibrium proves to be more efficient and 
leads  to  less  arms  accumulation  and  thus  to  more  consumption  than  the 
open-loop Nash equilibrium (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1990)).  The reason 
is that when one country decides to invest in an additional weapon, it realizes 
that the security of  rival countries is threatened and therefore in the feedback 
model  the  rivals  respond  by  investing  more  in  weapons.  Obviously,  this 
increases  the  marginal  cost  of  investment  in  an  additional  weapon  and 
therefore  the  feedback  model  results  in  lower  weapon  stocks.  (The policy 
recommendation is that countries should agree to monitor each other's weapon 
stocks.) This is an example where the feedback equilibrium proves to be better 
for both players in terms of  utility than the open-loop one, which is in contrast 
with the usual implication in the literature. 
2.3.  Open-loop and feedback  Stackelberg  equilibrium 
Another  standard non-cooperative equilibrium  concept  is  the  Stackelberg 
concept. The difference with the Nash concept is the leader/follower  structure 
which means that one of the players (the leader) acts first or, to put it differently, 
the action or strategy of the leader is part of the information set of the follower. 
This may be relevant  when one of  the players has a dominant position on the 
market. There are again two optimization problems. The first one determines 
the rational reaction of the follower to the action or strategy of  the leader. This 
rational reaction, which is not a hypothetical reaction as in the Nash concept 
but a real reaction, is given by  the reaction function for the follower (5'). The 
second optimization problem determines the optimal action or strategy of  the 
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For the  open-loop decision model  this implies  that the  constraints of  this 
optimization problem consist of the forward recursive system (I),  equation (5') 
for  the  follower  and  the  backward  recursive  system  for  the  co-states. The 
resulting  open-loop  Stackelberg  equilibrium  (Kydland  (1975); Baaar  and 
Olsder (1982), Section  7.2; de Zeeuw  (1984), Section  4.5) for the  prototype 
model will  not be  given here, because it is not immediately  relevant  for this 
e~aluation.~ The backward recursiveness of  the so-called adjoint system implies 
forward-looking behaviour of  the follower, which leads to, what is called, time 
inconsistency of  the optimal actions of  the leader. The leader can, by making 
decisions about its future policy actions, manipulate the current policy actions 
of  the follower. However, once the follower has implemented  those actions, it 
might  pay  the  leader  (where it  is  possible)  to  renege  and deviate from  the 
previous decisions about its policies. These issues of  time inconsistency will be 
dealt with in the next section. 
For  the  feedback  decision  model  the  first-order  conditions  of  the  two 
optimization problems are 
~jxj + {g'  + (axflaxj)'~;'}  + gj} =  (11) {~jy,  0 
where i is the follower and j is the leader. This implies that the action xf  follows 
the action xj, so that they are not simultaneous. The crucial difference with the 
Nash concept is the reaction coefficient 8xfldxj = - ( ~  t  t' +f Bf'KfBf)-'  Bf'KiBj 
The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is given by 
where 
and the backward recursions by 
In any case, one could in principle obtain the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium as the static 
Stackelberg equilibrium of  the final-form model (3).That is, xi = - (Ri+ B"QiBi)-' (Bjxj + s) is 
the optimal reaction of the follower i to the actions of  the leader j. The leader minimizes its welfare 
loss function subject to the reaction function of  the follower, which gives xj = -(Rj+ @'QjE1)'s 
where B* = [I - B'(Rif B"QIB')-']BJ. 624  DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
= A;{(I+ B~F~)'F~'R~[F~(I + B~F~)s, 
+ Ffigf+ f7fBjFjigf+  ~  f  ~  j j]~  j  j 
r  Sr 
+ (I  + B~F~)'(I  + B~F;)(I + B~F:)'{K~[(I  + B~F~)s, 
+ BfFfigf + (I+ BfFf)Bj(Fjigf + Fjjgj)]+ gf)) 
Given the parameters, the action xf  of  the follower  i is a function of  the state 
y,-,  and the  action  xj of the  leader  i  which  both  belong  to the  follower's 
information set. The action xj of the leader j is only a function of the state y,-, . 
It is  essential to note that for logical  reasons the  players  have each  other's 
action in their information set at the same time. Either player  i acts first, so 
that the action xi is part of  the information set of  player j,  or it is the other 
way around. Otherwise, the equilibrium is not well-defined and one may end 
up with  a multiplicity  of  'solutions'.  The follower just  plays  optimally  given 
the  state of  the  economy  and  the  action  of  the  leader.  In  the  Stackelberg 
equilibrum the leader expects the follower to react rationally and the action is 
chosen accordingly. The rational reaction is determined by the first equation 
of  (11) and  influences  the  reaction  coefficient  3xfl;lxj as  well  as  the  state 
transition y, in the second equation of  (11).  After substitution of  this rational 
reaction, the second equation of (1  1 ) determines the optimal action of the leader 
and not an optimal reaction, because the leader is not reacting to the follower. 
These considerations are essentially of  a static nature and they  apply also to 
the open-loop decision model, especially when the final-form representation (3), 
(4)  is used. The only difference is that in the feedback decision model the leader 
reacts indirectly to past  actions of  the follower  through observations on the 
state of  the  economy. The feedback  equilibrium  is  obtained from  dynamic 
programming and therefore satisfies subgame perfectness in the sense described 
before. Subgame perfectness implies that the leader has no incentive to deviate 
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2.4.  Consistent conjectural cariations equilibrium 
Recently, a third non-cooperative equilibrium concept for difference games 
has been  developed: the  consistent  conjectural  variations  equilibrium (for the 
open/closed-loop  case  from  the  final-form  representation:  Hughes  Hallett 
(1984); Brandsma and Hughes Hallett  (1984); for the feedback  case: Bagar, 
Turnovsky and d'Orey (1986). The equilibrium was  originally introduced  in 
the  context  of  oligopoly  theory  (Bresnahan (1981)) and is  based  upon  the 
concept of conjectural variation (Bowley (1924)).  A conjectural variation in this 
context  is  a  reaction  coefficient  dx;/?xj as  in  (ll), which  comes  from  a 
conjecture of player j with respect to the reaction of player i. In the Stackelberg 
equilibrium the leader conjectures a rational reaction function of  the follower 
and will  be right  in  this conjecture. In the Nash  equilibrium the two players 
conjecture the  action  of  the  other player  and they  are assumed  to  be  right 
in  their  conjecture  (consistency  argument). The  idea  behind  the  consistent 
conjectural variations equilibrium is that the two players conjecture the reaction 
of  the other player and that they  are assumed to be right in their conjecture. 
In  the  literature  up  to now  the  equilibrium  is  determined  by  introducing 
conjectural variations for both players and requiring consistency of  conjectural 
variations and hypothetical reaction coefficients. Since the Nash equilibrium 
requires  correct  conjectures  of  action  for  both  players  and the  Stackelberg 
equilibrium requires that the leader has correct conjectures about the reactions 
of  the  follower,  one could  argue  that  the  consistent  conjectural  variations 
equilibrium  is  a  natural  extension  as  it  requires  correct  conjectures  about 
reactions for both players. However, as it is done, the extension leads to logical 
inconsistencies (Daughety (1985); de Zeeuw and van  der Ploeg (1987)). The 
reason  is  simply, that one cannot  mix  the  idea  of  hypothetical  reactions in 
notional time of the Nash concept with the idea of conjectured reactions, which 
actually  degenerate the  game into separate optimization  problems. This will 
become more clear in the sequel. The consistent conjectural variations concept 
is not well-defined. It is certainly not true that the proposed equilibrium is a 
Nash equilibrium  or, worse, a superior one (in contrast to the statements in 
Hughes Hallett ( 1984)6 and Brandsma and Hughes Hallett ( 1984)). 
The ideas of  conjectures  (about actions) and conjectural variations (about 
reactions) are alright, but the consistency argument should be different. There 
are two ways out. The first one is to formulate an infinite regress decision model 
of  the  type  'player  i  conjectures  that  player  j  conjectures  that  player  i 
conjectures... . ad infinitum' (Daughety (1985)).  The other way out is to start 
with  conjectures  and  corresponding  conjectural  variations  and  to  require 
In this and later papers an unfortunate mistake has slipped in. Apart from a type-setting error 
(the term  G~'",Q"'(l/O) should not appear at the end of  the first  line of  equation (16)),  there is 
also a more fundamental error (the ' -' after Gt' in the first line of (16) should be  a ' + ') which 
seems to lead  a persistent  life  in  later papers  as well.  However,  Andries  Brandsma  has  said in 
private communication that most computer algorithms are, in fact, based on equation (14) so that 
may of  the empirical results may not be affected by  this second error. 626  DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION 
consistency of  conjectures  and actions. To stress the difference  the resulting 
equilibrium will be called consistent conjectures equilibrium. Player i minimizes 
the welfare loss function (2)subject to (1)and subject to the conjectures about 
the reactions of player j, xj(xf).  Player j faces a similar problem. The conjectures 
x:(xf)  and xf(xj)account for the conjectural variations axj/dxf  and dxflaxj. 
The first-order conditions with conjectures are for player i: 
Rfxf  + {Bf'+ (ax//dxf)'~21,'}{~fj),  0 + gf} = 
and for player j: 
Rjxj + {&'+ (a~f/d~~)'Bf'){~jj), = 0 + gj} 
y, = A,y,-, + Bfxf(xj) + Bjxj + s,. 
The first set of equations yields an equation in xf  determining the optimal action 
of player i and the second set yields an equation in xj determining the optimal 
action  of  player  j.  In  equilibrium consistency  of  conjectures  and actions is 
required, that is these optimal actions have to fit the conjectures, and therefore 
yield restrictions on the parameters of  the conjectures. This weaker concept of 
consistency is not enough to guarantee uniqueness and usually leads to multiple 
equilibria. How can the idea of  consistency of conjectures and reactions arise? 
In  that  literature  reaction  functions  are  created  by  not  substituting  the 
conjectures  in  the state transition  y,,  which  does not seem  very  sensible. As 
first-order conditions with conjectures are then taken: 
and 
yr = A,y,-I + Bfxf+ B/xj + s,. 
The resulting 'reaction functions', 2f(xj)and 2j(xf), lead to reaction coefficients, 
d2fldxj and z.i?/(xf), which must match the conjectural variations. There are, 
however,  not  only  logical  difficulties  with  this  approach.  The  consistent 
conjectural variations equilibrium for the open-loop model in final form (3), 
(4)suffers from more problems.  The result  is  time-inconsistent  for the same 
reason as the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium is (see section 3).Furthermore, 
the outcome is typically  worse for the players than the Nash outcome and it 
suffers from non-uniqueness and instability. Two (static) examples will clarify 
these statements. 
Example  I  (Hughes Hallett (1984)pp. 389-90) 
Consider the game with objectives wi = y2 + (xi)' where y = x1  + x2 - 1. 
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Hughes  Hallett  argues  that  xi' 215  is  a  better  solution,  because  the 
associated outcome wi = 115 implies an improvement for both players. This is 
not  surprising,  since  it  is  well  known  that  it  is  possible  to  find  Pareto 
improvements  over  the  Nash  outcome  even  though  there  is  no  unilateral 
incentive for any player to deviate from the Nash equilibrium. In fact, xi = 215 
is what is generally called the Nash bargaining solution. However, this solution 
is not sustained as a consistent conjectural variations equilibrium. To find one, 
Hughes Hallett describes an iterative procedure and searches for a fixed point 
in the conjectured and actual 'reaction coefficients'. This procedure starts from 
an initial pair (dl,  d2)  of conjectural variations, where di - 2xi/2xj, and yields 
new  pairs  corresponding  to  the  'reaction  coefficients'  ( -( 1 + d2)/(2+ d2), 
-(1 + d1)/(2  + dl)).  There are two fixed points here, namely di = -312 ) 112 
$with corresponding actions xi = 112 $ 1/10 $and outcome wi = 112 + 
1/10 fi.Both  consistent  conjectural  variations  equilibria  produce  worse 
results for both players as compared to the Nash equilibrium. Futhermore, they 
do not satisfy the Nash property since each player can unilaterally improve by 
playing, for example, xi = 114 f 1/20  fi.  Finally, it follows from the derivative 
of  the fixed point mapping, -1/(2 + di)' = -312  -t  112 $,  that one of  the 
fixed points (di  = -312  + 112 4) is stable whilst the other is  unstable. 
The Nash bargaining solution xi = 215 is, however, sustained as a consistent 
conjectures equilibrium. The conjectures 'my rival mimicks what I do', xi = xj, 
implies conjectural variations equal to 1 and leads to optimal actions x'= 2/5, 
which are consistent with the conjectures. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
is, as always,  also sustained  as a consistent  conjectures equilibrium, since it 
corresponds  to  zero  conjectural  variations.  A  final  example  of  such  an 
equilibrium is the solution xi = 0 with outcome wi = 1, which results from the 
conjectures xi = -xj  with conjectural variations -1. However, this outcome 
is obviously unattractive for the players: 
Example 2 
Consider the game with objectives  MI' = 1/2(y1y+ xi'xi)  where y = x1 + x2 
+ s, s = [I, 11' and xi  are two-dimensional vectors. The non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium is  xi = [-113, -1/31' with outcome wi = 219. 
The consistent conjectural variations (Dl,  D2)  are characterized by 
(0')'+ 3Di + I = 0.  (14) 
There are an infinite number of  solutions to (14) (see appendix), which can be 
found  analytically after some tedious calculations. Hughes Hallett's  iterative 
scheme corresponds to: 
= - (21 + D;)-'(I  + D;) = (21 + D;)-'  - I. 
The local stability of  the iterative scheme in  the neighbourhood  of  the fixed 
points follows if  all of  the eigenvalues of  the Jacobian 
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evaluated at Dj, are inside the unit circle. It can be  shown after considerable 
manipulation that Di = ( -312  + 1!2,,/5)  I  is the only stable fixed point (see 
appendix). Again the corresponding welfare loss, tvi = 112 - 1/ 104, is higher 
than the welfare loss which can be obtained under the Nash concept. Finally, 
the Nash equilibrium is not sustained as a conjectural variations equilibrium, 
because xi = -113 s,  xi = ~'(x' + s)  and (14) are inconsistent. 
3.  Time inconsistency,  subgame perfectness and atomistic agents 
In section 2 several decision models for dynamic policy evaluation problems 
have been discussed. This section discusses properties of these dynamic decision 
models, such as time inconsistency, subgame perfectness and credibility. 
A  decision model  is  time  inconsistent  if there is an incentive for one of  the 
players to renege on the initially  chosen strategy in the future (Kydland and 
Prescott (1977)). A  decision model which  typically  is  time-inconsistent  is  the 
open-loop  Stackelberg equilibrium. It  should  be  noted  here  that  there  is  a 
semantic difficulty with this analysis. Strictly speaking it is assumed that it is 
impossible for players to renege in an open-loop decision model. However, in 
practice such commitments are difficult to enforce and time inconsistency may 
therefore be  regarded as an undesirable property  of  a decision model. In the 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium the leader's strategy {xi,. . . ,  x$) is optimal 
given the follower's rational reaction {xi,. . . ,  xk}.  However, at time s > 1 the 
remaining strategy {xi,.. . ,  x$) of the leader is typically not optimal anymore, 
given the rational reaction of  the follower at time s > 1. The reason is that at 
lime s the actions {xi,.. . ,  x$}  have done the job of  influencing the past actions 
of  the follower and can now be solely employed to influence the current and 
future actions of the follower. This is particularly so when the leader does not 
have sufficient instruments, in the face of private market failures, to achieve the 
first-best  outcome  in  the  first  place.  When  the  leader  does  have  sufficient 
instruments  to achieve the  first-best outcome  there  is  clearly  no problem  of 
time inconsistency (Hillier and Malcomson (1984)).  The strategy announcement 
{xi,.. . ,xi)  can be considered as some sort of threat which helped to force the 
follower  to  play  {xi,. . . ,  xt-, ).  The  leader  tries  to  influence  the  future 
expectations  of  the  follower  in  order  to  get  a  better  outcome  by  making 
such  an announcement,  irrespective  of  whether  the  leader  will  stick  to  the 
announcement or not. 
For example, a benevolent government, who maximizes the gross consumers' 
surplus of  the representative  household, may announce taxation of  the supply 
of  labour  rather  than  of  capital  tomorrow  in  order  to  induce  agents  to 
accumulate  capital  today.  Once  the  capital  stock  is  in  place,  it  pays  the 
government (improves economic welfare) to renege by taxing capital, instead 
of  labour,  tomorrow,  despite  the  fact  that  the  government  has  the  same 
preferences as the representative household. The use of lump-sum taxation gives 
the first-best result in this case and avoids the problem of dynamic inconsistency 
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follower  which  looses  its  impact  as soon  as  actions  are  performed.  In  the 
example, once  the investment  has occurred, the government can extract  the 
quasi-rent on it. The same phenomenon occurs in other models with forward- 
looking variables such as models with rational expectations. For example, the 
optimal taxation  of  a monetary economy with a Cagan-type money demand 
function is time inconsistent (Calvo (1978)).  The reason is that the government 
finds it optimal to announce a low monetary growth rate in  order to induce 
large holdings of real money balances and low inflation, but once the real money 
balances have been accumulated it pays the government to renege and impose 
a surprise inflation tax. Strictly speaking, the incentives to renege in these two 
examples are only hypothetical as the commitment in the open-loop Stackelberg 
equilibrium extends over the entire planning period. 
This type of forward-looking behaviour can easily be derived for the class of 
models defined in section 2. For the follower the strategy xj of  the leader has 
the same role as the exogeneous input s,. The rational reaction xf  of the follower 
is given by equation (5') which means that it is a function of x{ and gf.According 
to (7)  gf is a function of all the future exogeneous inputs, so that xf  is a function 
of current and future actions of  the leader: 
The  feedback  Stackelberg  equilibrium,  however,  is  time  consistent  by 
construction,  because  it  is  based  on the  idea  that  the  players  are ex-ante 
constantly  given  the  opportunity  to  renege  and  therefore  ex-post  have  no 
incentive  to renege.  But  there  is  more.  Feedback  decision  models have  the 
stronger  property  of  subgame  perfectness.  A  game  equilibrium  is  subgame 
perfect  if  it remains an equilibrium for any subgame. A subgame in this respect 
is a game with the same players, objectives and system dynamics, but starting 
from an arbitrary state y, at time s, 1 5 s 5 7:  This concept reveals precisely 
the structure of dynamic programming and thus of the feedback decision model. 
To avoid  confusion  with  the  original  definition  of  subgame  perfectness  in 
extensive-form games (Selten (1975)), it  might  be  better to call  this  concept 
subgame perfectness  without  perfect  recall  or Markov  subgame  perfectness 
(Fershtman (1989)).  It can be said that subgame perfectness is time consistency 
on the equilibrium path as well as off  the equilibrium path and is therefore a 
stronger concept. A subgame perfect equilibrium is robust against mistakes or 
other  unexpected  events  (Selten  (1975)). Because  subgame  perfectness  is 
stronger  than  time  consistency,  it  is  possible  to  formulate  a  Stackelberg 
equilibrium which is time consistent  but not subgame perfect and which  can 
be  called  a  consistent  open-loop  Stackelberg  equilibrium  (Buiter (1983)); 
Meijdam and de Zeeuw (1986)). Such an equilibrium ignores the effect of  the 
leader's  future  actions  on  the  follower's  current  actions.  This  was  already 
proposed by  Kydland and Prescott (1977, p. 476), but they did not recognize 
that this is only one possible consistent equilibrium. The consistent solution in 
Fischer  (1980) is  another  example  of  a  consistent  open-loop  Stackelberg 
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TABLE 3 
Optimal dynamic taxation (Fischer, 1980)* 
Tax rates on 
Solution  Social welfare  Capital  capital  labour 
Command optimum  0.759  1.576 
Open-loop  0.706  1.274  0.334  0.332 
Consistent open-loop  0.625  0.986  0.479  0.000 
Subgame perfect  0.724  1.275  0.435  0.000 
*The subgame-perfect  solution  is  relewnt  under  the  assumption  of  a  dominant 
government faced  with  only  one household-producer. The consistent  open-loop solution 
is relevant under the assumption of a dominant government faced with an infinite number 
of atomistic agents. 
many identical consumers or atomistic agents (de Zeeuw, Groot and Withagen 
(1988)).  This equilibrium leads to lower social welfare than the time-inconsistent 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. Many authors have argued that this is the 
price one has to pay for a lack of  credibility. However, it is a mistake to think 
that players are always worse off in a time-consistent equilibrium. Table 3 shows 
that for Fischer's (1980) example of  optimal dynamic taxation of  capital and 
labour the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, which is based on the assumption 
of  one dominant government and one large household-producer rather than 
on the assumption of  atomistic agents, leads to higher social welfare than the 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. The reason is that the losses from avoiding 
the problem  of  time  inconsistency  are off-set  by  the  gains  from  additional 
information  (see  also  the  example  of  arms  accumulation  discussed  in 
section 2.2). 
It is also possible to achieve time consistency  by  requiring that the leader 
employs a  feedback  decision  model,  whereas  the follower  still  employs  the 
open-loop decision model (Cohen and Michel (1988)). In our framework the 
ideas  of  subgame perfectness  and dynamic programming are equivalent and 
these ideas imply time consistency. However, there are time-consistent equilibria 
which  are not  subgame perfect  and  which  can  therefore  not  be  found  by 
dynamic programming. 
The open-loop Nash equilibrium is time-consistent. As  long as the state of 
the economic system follows the open-loop Nash equilibrium path none of  the 
players  has  an  incentive  to  renege.  The  open-loop  consistent  conjectural 
variations equilibrium, however, is time inconsistent for the same reason as the 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is. Time inconsistency  is a property of  an 
equilibrium  and can  only  be  avoided  by  changing  the  equilibrium  concept. 
There is  no technical  problem  as is  claimed  by  Hughes Hallett (1984) and 
Brandsma and Hughes Hallett (1984).7 
A strategy is credible if  it contains announcements on future actions and if 
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these  announcements are believed  by  the other players. Announcements  are 
believed if  the announced actions are considered to be optimal at the time of 
action or, alternatively, if  there will  be  no incentive, in  the eyes of  the other 
players,  to  act  differently  at  the  time  the  action  has  to  be  implemented. 
Time-inconsistent strategies are an example of  strategies that are not credible. 
Strictly speaking, this applies only to decision models without  commitments. 
The credibility problem can also occur in a static context where players are in 
principle of equal strength and act simultaneously. One of  the players can try 
to become  a Stackelberg leader by  announcing the action  beforehand. If  the 
announcement has effect the Stackelberg equilibrium may result. In this case, 
however, the  'leader'  can do even  better,  because  generally there will  be  an 
incentive to deviate from  the announcement under  the assumption that the 
other player expects it to be true. In this simple framework the only credible 
announcement is the Nash action, because this is the only announcement that 
is  at  the  same  time  the  optimal  reaction  to  the  optimal  reaction  to  the 
announcement (Meijdam and de Zeeuw (1986)).  However, in a more advanced 
framework with  imperfect  (or incomplete) information, reputational effects in 
a sequential equilibrium can lead to credible strategies which  differ from the 
complete-information  Nash  equilibrium  (Kreps and  Wilson  (1982)). For 
example, with incomplete information it is possible to have the private sector 
believing announcements of the government that it will fight inflation, whereas 
with complete information the Nash announcement of high inflation is the only 
credible one (Backus and Driffill (1985)).  Alternatively, reputational effects can 
occur when the game is repeated  indefinitely  (e.g. Barro and Gordon (1983)). 
When the discount rate is small enough, reneging results in punishments which 
are relatively  large and therefore there may be no temptation to renege  even 
though  the  policy  actions  may  be  time-inconsistent  in  the  absence  of  such 
reputational effects. 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper several methods to analyze policy problems with two or more 
decision makers are evaluated. These methods employ decision models which 
are distinguished according to different non-cooperative game-theoretic solution 
concepts  (Nash, Stackelberg, consistent  conjectural  variations), different 
information  structures  (open-loop, closed-loop)  and  different  periods  of 
commitment. The decision models are evaluated by considering properties such 
as time  consistency, subgame perfectness  and credibility, and the links with 
solution  techniques  like  dynamic  programming  and Pontryagin's  minimum 
principle are precisely described. 
The formulation  of  the problem  on the  basis  of  economic models in  final 
form is  rejected  for games, because it  is  difficult to employ crucial  dynamic 
concepts  and  techniques  in  this  formulation.  The  consistent  conjectural 
variations  equilibrium  is  rejected  on principles  of  logic  and  the  alternative 
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open-loop information structure and binding commitments can suffer from time 
inconsistency.  The  assumption  of  binding  commitments  means  that  it  is 
impossible to renege and therefore time inconsistency can, strictly speaking, not 
be  a problem.  However,  time  inconsistency  is  an unattractive  feature  for  a 
decision  model to display, because  it puts great  strain on the assumption of 
binding  commitments.  The  decision  models  with  closed-loop  information 
structure  and  without  commitments  are  subgame  perfect  and  thus  time-
consistent, and therefore they  deserve more attention. When  the Stackelberg 
leader/follower structure is based upon announcements and not upon sequential 
actions, the requirement of  credibility leads back  to Nash. Credible strategies 
can also be  based on reputational effects. 
The  class  of  difference  games  discussed  in  this  paper  assumes  quadratic 
preferences and linear, discrete-time models, which keeps matters tractable. The 
extension of  the methods discussed in this paper to continuous-time models is 
easy and leads to so-called  differential games. The extension to models with 
non-quadratic preferences and non-linear models is not easy, which is  a pity 
as many interesting economic problems fall into this category. Although it  is 
relatively  straightforward  to  develop  iterative  Gauss-Newton  algorithms  to 
derive open-loop Stackelberg or Nash equilibria, it is very difficult to calculate 
feedback  Stackelberg or Nash  equilibria  for  non-linear  models  and/or non- 
quadratic  preferences.  The  reason  is  that  it  usually  is  impossible  to  find 
analytical expressions for the functional forms of  the value functions. All  that 
one can do in such cases is  to discretize the space of  control variables of  the 
players  and calculate  the  subgame-perfect solution numerically  by  dynamic 
programming  (as was  done in  Figure  1). This  procedure  rapidly  runs  into 
combinatorial  problems  and  is  thus  very  expensive  in  terms  of  computer 
requirements  of  storage and time. (Discretization also means that  it  is not 
possible to calculate the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium, but this 
is not too serious as this  equilibrium suffers from logical problems  anyway.) 
This problem disappears when there are no externalities or market imperfections, 
because  then  it  is  possible  to  invoke  the  fundamental  theorem  of  welfare 
economics  which  says  that  the  market  (read  differenceldifferential  game) 
outcome  is  the  same  as  the  outcome  of  a  centrally  planned  or  command 
economy. Kydland and Prescott (1982) use this to avoid the difficult derivation 
of  value  functions  for  the  market  outcome. Unfortunately, most  interesting 
policy problems are real games and are therefore characterized by externalities 
and market imperfections so that the approach used by  Kydland and Prescott 
(1982) cannot  be  applied. It follows that  future  research  must  be  concerned 
with the technical difficulties of calculating value functions and subgame-perfect 
outcomes for non-linear models and non-quadratic preferences (cf. Lucas, 1987). 
Tilburg University, The Netherlands 
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APPENDIX 
1.  Open-loop Nash equilibrium 
Pontryagin's minimum principle  is  applied to the  problem (2), (I)  for each  player, given  the 
strategy of  the other player. Because Qf  2 0 and Rj > 0, the welfare loss functions (2) are strictly 
convex in x  and convex in y.  Because the state transition (1)  is linear in y  and x,the welfare loss 
functions (2) are in  fact  strictly  convex  on  the strategy  spaces.  If  follows,  that  the  necessary 
conditions of  the minimum principle are also sufficient and lead to a unique optimal solution. 
The Hamiltonians are 
,  . 
H1(jjr-,,x:,  t,  p:) = t(j1;-,Q;,  y,,  + xi Rf.xf} 
where pf  is the so-called co-state or adjoint variable. Necessary and sufficient conditionx for minima 
are (1) and 
For an open-loop Nash equilibrium the two-point  boundary value problems (I),  (A.2), (A.3) for 
i = 1,2 have to be  solved simultaneously and can be solved analytically  by  postulating a linear A. J. DE ZEEUW AND F. VAN DER PLOEG 
relationship  between the state y  and the co-state p: 
p; = K;yi+ g:. 
Substitution of (A.4)  into (A.2) leads to (5)  and to 
= - t~t + gi) [R;] -IB;'{K~  ,  ' 
Substitution of (AS)  into (I)  and some rewriting yields 
E,y, = A,y,-, +st - B;[R:l1Bj'y:- B~[R~]'B:~~, 
where 
E, = I  + B:[R:]'B~'K: + Bf[R:llBf  Kf, 
which is assumed to be non-singular. Substitution of  (A.6) into (A.4) and then of (A.4) into (A.3) 
leads to equations which  have to hold for every  y,-,  and which, therefore, lead to the backward 
recursive equations (6)  and (7). 
2.  Feedback  Nash equilibrium 
The feedback Nash equilibrium is found by solving simultaneously the equations of  Bellman's 
principle of  dynamic programming 
Because the welfare loss functions (2) are quadratic in y and x and the state transition (I)  is linear 
in ).and x, the optimal actions must be linear in J  and hence the value functions must be quadratic 
in y: 
~'i(t,~,~,)=~~~~~,K~~l~~~-,  (A.8) +~~'~,~~,-,+c~~,, 
where, without loss of generality, it  is  assumed that the matrices K  are symmetric. 
The minimizations of the right-hand sides of (A.7),where y, is given by (11,lead to the conditions 
(5)which yield (A.5)and (A.6).These results give the values of the right-hand sides of(A.7).Because 
the equations of  dynamic programming  have to hold  for every y,-, , the quadratic terms in y,-, 
of the left-hand sides and the right-hand sides of (A.7)and the linear terms in y,,  can be compared 
separately. These comparisons yield the backward recursive equations (8)  and (9). 
3. Feedback  Stackelberg equilibrium 
The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is found by solving the equations of dynamic programming 
(A.7),where now the action r;of the follower is a function of  the action x:  of the leader. The value 
functions are again given by (A.8).The minimizations of  the right-hand sides of  (A.7),where J, is 
given  by  (I),  lead to the conditions (11).  The first  equation  of  (11) and (1) lead  to the rational 
reaction of the follower, which is given by the first equation of (12).The reaction coefficient becomes 
Substitution of the first equation of  (12) into (1)  yields 
jJr = (I  + BfF~)(A,!,,_, + B;s: + s,)+ BiF:igf.  (A.lO) 
Substitution  of  (A.9)  and (A.lO) into the second equation of  (11) yields  the second equation of 
(12).The matrices that are inverted are non-singular, because they are positive definite on the basis 
of  the convexity assumptions with respect to the welfare loss functions. 636  DIFFERENCE GAMES  AND  POLICY EVALUATION 
Substitution of the second equation of (12)into the first equation of (12)and into (A.lO)yields 
x: = F;(1+ B:F:)(A,y,-, + s,) 
+ F:~; + F;B:F:"~; + F;B:F:J~:  (~.11) 
and 
y, =(I + B;F:)(I+ B:F:)(A,~,-,+ s,) 
+ B;F('~; + (1  + B:F;)B/(F:'~: + ~rg:).  (A.12) 
These results give the values of  the right-hand sides of (A.7).Comparing quadratic terms and linear 
terms in ji-, leads to the backward recursive equations of  the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. 
4.  Example 2 
The solutions of  equation (14) are: 
The sets of eigenvalues of  i! vec Dl,,  /i! vec Di that have to be evaluated are 

{four times  -312  + l/2$},  (four times  -312 - ( -312  -312  1/2&
 1/2~/3},  + 112~3,  - 1, 
11,  {-312  + 112~3, -312 - 1/24,  l,l}  and  (-312  + 1/2$,  -312 - 1/2~3,1, I}, res-
pectively, so that the first solution is the only one with all eigenvalues inside the unit circle and is 
therefore the only stable fixed point. 